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Average  Marginal Tax  Rates 
from Social  Security  and  the 
Individual  Income  Tax* 
In  our previous paper (Barro and  Sahasakul 
1983)  we provided  estimates of average marginal 
tax rates from the federal individual  income tax 
for 1916-80. Now  we  extend these figures to 
1983 and supplement  them to include the social 
security tax on labor earnings. With this addi- 
tion, in 1983  the included  taxes constitute 73%  of 
federal and 45%  of total government  receipts. If 
some nontax items are excluded, the values are 
78%  and 53%, respectively.1 
In the main, the social security levy is a flat- 
rate tax, paid partly by workers, partly by em- 
ployers, and partly by  self-employed persons. 
The computation  of average  marginal  tax rates is 
simpler than in the case of the federal income 
tax, which has a graduated-rate  structure  and al- 
lows for numerous deductions from taxable in- 
come. The main complications  that arise for the 
social security tax  are the following. (a)  For 
workers and self-employed persons with earn- 
ings above a ceiling value the marginal  tax rate is 
nil; (b) the tax applies only to labor  earnings  (and 
to earnings  from self-employment)  rather  than to 
total income; (c)  the  employer and employee 
We extend previous es- 
timates of the average 
marginal  tax rate from 
the federal individual 
income tax to include 
social security. Our 
computations  consider 
the tax rates on em- 
ployers, employees, 
and the self-employed; 
the income that ac- 
crues to persons with 
earnings  below the ceil- 
ing; and the effective 
deductibility  of em- 
ployers' social security 
contributions  from 
workers' taxable in- 
come. The net effect of 
social security on the 
average marginal  tax 
rate is below .02 until 
1966  but then rises to 
.03 in 1968, .04 in 1973, 
.05 in 1974, .06 in 1979, 
and .07 in 1982. 
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parts of  the  tax  differ because the  employer's payments are not 
counted as part of the employee's taxable income; and (d) an individ- 
ual's future social security benefits depend positively on that person's 
history  of contributions.  The last element  reduces the effective tax rate 
that  an individual  faces. In fact, Gordon  (1982)  argues  that this consid- 
eration  is important  for people who are close to retirement  age. Gener- 
ally, the inclusion of this effect would require forecasts of benefit 
schedules as well as survival  probabilities.  It would also be necessary 
to include various complexities of the social security law, such as the 
declining  marginal  effect of past covered earnings  on benefits, the ex- 
clusion of some years of earnings  from the formula,  and the treatment 
of spouses and dependents. In any event, our subsequent  calculations 
do not take account of the effects of social security contributions  on 
future  benefits. Thus, by including  only the tax aspects of these "con- 
tributions," we somewhat overstate the effective marginal  tax rates 
from the social security program. 
I.  Theoretical  Considerations 
Let Sf be the social security tax rate (marginal  and average)  paid by a 
firm  on workers' earnings. If profits are taxed at the rate T,  then the 
firm's after-tax  profits  are 
I  =  (1  -  TU)  [F(L)  -  wL(1  +  Sf)],  (1) 
where  L is the quantity  of labor  input, w is the real wage rate, and  F(L) 
is the production  function. Maximization  of profit  implies 
F'  =  w(1 +  Sf),  (2) 
where F' is labor's marginal  product. 
The representative  worker's total real income, Y, equals wL +  I, 
where I is nonlabor  income. As in our previous paper, this income is 
spent on consumption,  C, or on income taxes, T.2  In addition,  there is 
now the worker's social security tax, Se - wL, where Se is the employ- 
ee's (marginal  and average) contribution  rate. Thus we have 
Y =  wL  +  I  =  C  +  T +  Se(WL).  (3) 
As before, income taxes, T, depend on taxable income, Y -  D, where 
D is a broad concept of deductions. If utility depends positively on 
consumption  and negatively  on work, then the first-order  condition  for 
2. For present purposes  it is unnecessary  for us to consider  two categories  of con- 
sumption-depending on the treatment  by the tax law-as  we did in the earlier  paper. 
We also do not allow here for efforts aimed  at avoiding  income taxes. Average Marginal Tax Rates  557 
maximizing  utility can be written as 
-  a U/aL  adUtac =  w(l  -  T' -  Se),  (4) 
where T' is the marginal  income-tax rate. 
Substituting  for w from equation (2)4nto equation (4) implies 
-aU/aL  -  F'(l  -  T'  -  Se) 
au/ac  1 +  Sf 
Thus equation  (5) shows how the tax system creates a positive wedge 
between labor's marginal  product, F', and the utility rate of substitu- 
tion between consumption  and leisure, -(adU/L)I(adUIC). 
Let v be the overall effective marginal  tax rate on labor's marginal 
product, F'. Then equation (5) implies 
1 -  T'  -Se 
1+  Sf 
or 
1  (Sf  +  Se  +  T').  (6) 
Thus the tax system effectively deflates labor's marginal  product, F', 
by the factor 1 + sf (see eq. [2]) and then applies  the marginal  tax rate, 
Sf  +  Se  +  T'.3 If the social security tax is not purely a flat-rate  levy 
(because  of the ceiling on taxable  earnings  in the U.S. system), then we 
can interpret  sf and  Se in equation  (6) as the marginal  social security  tax 
rates. 
For self-employed  persons the formula  is simpler;  namely, if ss is the 
marginal  contribution  rate to social security, then the effective mar- 
ginal tax rate, Ts,  iS4 
Ts =  ss  +  T'.  (7) 
Previously, we calculated weighted averages, T', of the marginal 
income tax rates, T'. We weighted either by adjusted  gross income or 
by numbers of returns, and we computed arithmetic  and geometric 
averages. Here we consider only the series that we focused on earlier, 
which is the arithmetic  average weighted by adjusted  gross income. 
3. Note that  T does not depend  solely on the sum  Sf  +  Se* That  is because, unlike  the 
worker's  payments,  the employer's  payments  are not part  of the worker's  tax base. 
4.  If the marginal  tax rates, T', are equal, then the equation  of Ts from (7) to T in (6) 
requires  sS to be less than sf  +  Se,  as was true in the United States until 1984. For 
example,  if T' =  .3 and  sf  =  Se  =  .067 (the value  for 1982),  then  the equalizing  value  for 
Ss is .017.  The actual  value  of sS for 1982  was .0935.  The social security  law passed  in 1983 
and  effective  in 1984  sets the self-employed  rate  equal  to the sum  sf +  Se but provides  for 
some offsetting  income tax credits. 558  Journal of Business 
Equations (6)-(7) tell us the necessary extensions to go from the 
previous  measures, T', to weighted averages,  T,  that include  the social 
security tax; namely,5 
T  T  +  I  )  +  Q2  Ss  -  Q  S  ,  (8) 
where Sf,  Se,  and sS are now the social security contribution  rates for 
persons with earnings below the taxable ceiling;6  Q1  is the ratio to 
aggregate adjusted gross income of the wage and salary income of 
workers  with earnings  below the ceiling; Q2 is the corresponding  ratio 
for self-employed  persons; and  "'  is the (weighted)  average marginal 
tax rate for workers with earnings  below the ceiling. 
II.  Computations  of Tax Rates 
Table 1 shows the salaries and wages (col.  1) and self-employment 
income (col. 3) that accrue in each year to persons with earnings  below 
the ceiling. (In col. 4 the table shows the dollar  value of the ceiling for 
each year.) These data, combined with values of aggregate  adjusted 
gross income, allow us to calculate the weights Q1 and Q2, which 
appear  in equation (8). These weights are in columns 5-6 of table 1. 
For subsequent purposes the important  variable is Q1, the ratio to 
adjusted  gross income of the salaries and wages of persons below the 
ceiling. This ratio can be divided into two parts-first,  the ratio of 
salaries and wages of persons below the ceiling to the aggregate  of 
salaries  and wages (col. 2 of table 1) and, second, the ratio  of aggregate 
salaries  and wages to aggregate  adjusted  gross income. The latter  ratio 
is highly stable about its mean value of .84. Hence Q1  fluctuates  mainly 
because of changes in the fraction of overall salaries and wages that 
accrue to persons below the ceiling. This fraction depends in turn on 
the ceiling earnings  for social security in relation  to the distribution  of 
nominal earnings in the economy. For example, the decrease in fQ1 
from .46 in 1937  to .24 in 1965  corresponds  to a decline in the ratio of 
salaries and wages for persons below the ceiling to total salaries and 
wages from .57 to .29. This behavior  reflects the relatively  slow rise in 
the dollar ceiling on earnings, which increased  from $3,000 in 1937  to 
only $4,800 in 1965. However, the ceiling has advanced rapidly  since 
1965, reaching $35,700 in 1983. Correspondingly,  the ratio of salaries 
and wages for persons below the ceiling to total salaries and wages 
went from .29 in 1965  to .68 in 1983. This change led to an increase in 
Q1  from .24 in 1965  to .57 in 1983. 
5.  To get the last term  we approximate  T'/(1 +  Sf)  T'(1 -  Sf) in (6). This approxima- 
tion is satisfactory  for our data sample. 
6. Note that the social security  levy is a flat-rate  tax in this range. Average Marginal Tax Rates  559 
The values for Sf  =  Se and s,  for each year also appear  in table 1. 
(These values are nonzero only since the start of the social security 
program  in 1937.) Using these numbers we can calculate the second 
term,  QI(sf  +  Se)I/I +  Sf, and the third  term, Q2  ss, on the right  side of 
equation  (8). The results appear  in columns 2-3 of table 2. 
It is more complicated to calculate the final term of equation (8), 
which depends on the average marginal  tax rate T"  for workers with 
earnings  below the ceiling. From the IRS's Statistics of Income, Indi- 
vidual Tax Returns for each year, we approximated "'  by using the 
marginal  tax rates and associated values of adjusted  gross income for 
the following  filing  units. First, we take all returns  from  income classes 
for which the average of salaries and wages per return  is below the 
ceiling value. (For example, for 1980, when the ceiling on earnings  is 
$25,900, we go up to an adjusted  gross income per return  of $30,000.) 
We then include enough additional  joint returns  from income classes 
where the average  of salaries  and wages per return  is above the ceiling 
so as to exhaust the known total of salaries and wages that accrues to 
persons with earnings  below the ceiling. However, we carry out this 
calculation by using the lowest possible income classes; that is, we 
assume that low numbers for individuals' salaries and wages corre- 
spond to low numbers  for adjusted  gross income per return.  There is 
some approximation  here since some of the low values for salaries  and 
wages may come from either multiearner  families  or families  with high 
nonlabor  income, which would have high marginal  tax rates. But some 
experimentation  indicates that the potential  error  is quantitatively  un- 
important.  Column  4 of table 2 shows the resulting  calculation  for the 
final  term, -  QlsfT"I,  in equation  (8). Note that this term, which reflects 
the exclusion of firms' social security  payments  from workers'  taxable 
income, is always below .01 in magnitude. 
Our previous estimates of  the  average marginal tax  rate when 
weighted by adjusted  gross income, T', appear  in column 1 of table 2. 
With  the availability  of more recent data we can now extend the series 
from 1980  to 1983.  For 1981,  where the Reagan  tax cut applied  only to a 
small extent, the effects of bracket creep actually raised the average 
marginal  tax rate, T', from 30.4%  in 1980 to 31.3%  in 1981. But then 
there was a substantial  drop to 29.3%  in 1982  and 27.2%  in 1983. The 
decline in the average marginal  tax rate by 4.1 percentage  points from 
1981  to 1983  was much larger  than that (2.6 percentage  points) for the 
Kennedy-Johnson  tax cut in 1964.  When  later  data are available,  it will 
be interesting  to see the extent to which the average  marginal  tax rates 
declined further  in 1983  and 1984. 
The overall modifications  to incorporate  the social security  tax-the 
sum of columns  2-4 in table 2-appear  in column  5 of the table (labeled 
SS). Then the sum of columns 1 and 5 is the average  marginal  tax rate, 
T,  from the federal individual  income tax and the social security tax. 560  Journal of Business 
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TABLE 2  Average Marginal Tax Rates 
i  Sf  +  Se 
I +  Sf  2*S  -f  *  SfST  S 
Years  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
1916  .012  ...  ...  ...  ...  .012 
1917  .037  ...  ...  ...  ...  .037 
1918  .054  ...  ...  ...  ...  .054 
1919  .052  ...  ...  ...  ...  .052 
1920  .046  ...  ...  ...  ...  .046 
1921  .042  ...  ...  ...  .042 
1922  .046  ...  ...  ...  ...  .046 
1923  .033  ...  ...  ...  ...  .033 
1924  .035  ...  ...  ...  ...  .035 
1925  .030  ...  ...  ...  ...  .030 
1926  .028  ...  ...  ...  ...  .028 
1927  .032  ...  ...  ...  ...  .032 
1928  .041  ...  ...  ...  ...  .041 
1929  .035  ...  ...  ...  ...  .035 
1930  .023  ...  ...  ...  ...  .023 
1931  .017  ...  ...  ...  ...  .017 
1932  .029  ...  ...  ...  ...  .029 
1933  .031  ...  ...  ...  ...  .031 
1934  .034  ...  ...  ...  ...  .034 
1935  .038  ...  ...  ...  ...  .038 
1936  .052  ...  ...  ...  ...  .052 
1937  .046  .009  0  -.000  .009  .055 
1938  .034  .009  0  -.000  .009  .043 
1939  .038  .009  0  -.000  .009  .047 
1940  .056  .010  0  -.000  .009  .065 
1941  .113  .010  0  -  .000  .009  .123 
1942  .192  .009  0  -  .001  .008  .200 
1943  .209  .007  0  -.001  .007  .216 
1944  .252  .007  0  -.001  .006  .258 
1945  .257  .006  0  -.001  .006  .262 
1946  .226  .007  0  -.000  .007  .233 
1947  .226  .006  0  -.000  .006  .232 
1948  .180  .006  0  -  .000  .006  .185 
1949  .175  .006  0  -  .000  .005  .180 
1950  .196  .008  0  -  .000  .007  .202 
1951  .231  .010  .000  -  .001  .009  .240 
1952  .251  .009  .000  -  .001  .008  .259 
1953  .249  .008  .000  -  .001  .008  .257 
1954  .222  .010  .001  -  .001  .010  .231 
1955  .228  .012  .001  -  .001  .012  .240 
1956  .232  .012  .001  -  .001  .012  .243 
1957  .232  .013  .001  -  .001  .013  .245 
1958  .229  .013  .001  -  .001  .013  .242 
1959  .236  .016  .001  -  .001  .016  .252 
1960  .234  .018  .001  -  .002  .018  .253 
1961  .240  .017  .001  -  .002  .017  .257 
1962  .244  .017  .001  -  .002  .017  .260 
1963  .247  .019  .001  -  .002  .018  .265 
1964  .221  .018  .001  -  .001  .017  .238 Average Marginal Tax Rates  563 
TABLE 2 (Continued) 
S,  +  Se 
'I1  +  fl  S  ,  S,  -f11s  1  T"  SS 
Years  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
1965  .212  .017  .001  -  .001  .016  .229 
1966  .217  .028  .001  -  .002  .028  .245 
1967  .223  .028  .001  -  .002  .027  .250 
1968  .252  .032  .001  -  .003  .031  .283 
1969  .261  .032  .001  -  .003  .031  .292 
1970  .243  .031  .001  -  .003  .029  .272 
1971  .239  .031  .001  -  .003  .029  .268 
1972  .242  .034  .001  -  .003  .032  .274 
1973  .250  .044  .002  -  .004  .041  .291 
1974  .257  .050  .002  -  .004  .048  .305 
1975  .263  .050  .002  -  .005  .047  .310 
1976  .273  .050  .002  -  .005  .046  .319 
1977  .281  .050  .002  -  .005  .047  .328 
1978  .310  .052  .002  -  .006  .047  .357 
1979  .289  .061  .003  -  .007  .057  .346 
1980  .304  .062  .002  -  .008  .057  .362 
1981  .313  .070  .003  -  .010  .063  .376 
1982  .293  .071  .003  -  .008  .066  .359 
1983  .272  .072  .003  -  .008  .067  .339 
NOTE.-T'  is the average  marginal  income  tax rate,  weighted  by adjusted  gross  income,  from  Barro 
and  Sahasakul  (1983,  table  2, col. 1). Values  for 1981-82  are  estimates  based  on Thompson  and  Hicks 
(1983)  and Holik (1985);  the value for 1983  is estimated  from  U.S. Internal  Revenue  Service (1985, 
table  3.4). Cols. 2-4: calculated  with  data  from  table 1;  col. 5: SS = col. 2 + col. 3 + col. 4; col. 6: T 
=  col.  1 +  col.  5. 
These values are in column 6 of the table. Figure 1 shows the average 
marginal  tax rate from the individual  income tax, T' (col. 1 of table 2), 
the overall effect from social security, SS (col. 5), and the combined 
average marginal  tax rate, v (col. 6). 
Consider  the overall effects from the inclusion  of social security, as 
shown in column 5 of table 2 and in figure 1. The social security  term, 
SS, is in the neighborhood  of 1%  from 1937  until 1958, reaches 2%  in 
1960,  3%  in 1966,  4%  in 1973,  5%  in 1974,  6%  in 1979,  and  almost  7%  in 
1982. Thus the inclusion of this term produces a combined average 
marginal  tax rate, T, that rises more steeply than does the income tax 
rate, T', especially since 1965. Instead of rising from 21%  in 1965 to 
31%  in 1981  and 27%  in 1983,  we find that the T goes from 23%  in 1965 
to 38%  in 1981  and 34%  in 1983. 
The overall effect from social security on the average marginal  tax 
rate is always much less than the rate of employees below the ceiling, 
(Sf  +  se)I(l  +  Sf).  Primarily,  this difference arises because Q1-the 
ratio  of salaries  and wages below the ceiling  to aggregate  adjusted  gross 
income-is  much less than unity. As mentioned  before, the variations 
in Ql derive mainly from changes in the ratio of salaries and wages 
below the ceiling to total salaries  and wages, which appears  in column 564  Journal of Business 
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FIG. 1.-Average  marginal  tax rates 
2 of table 1. For example, in 1965  only 29%  of total salaries  and wages 
accrued  to persons below the ceiling. If there had been no ceiling (and, 
unrealistically,  if the rate of tax, Sf  =  Se,  were unchanged),  then the 
overall effect of SS would have increased  by a factor of 3.5, from .016 
to .056. On the other hand, the rapid  increase of the ceiling in recent 
years has made this effect less important.  In 1983,  where 68%  of total 
salaries  and wages accrued  to those below the ceiling, a removal  of the 
ceiling (with contribution  rates held fixed) would have raised  the effect 
from SS by a factor of 1.5, from .067 to .100. 
Table 3 compares the social security tax with the federal individual 
income tax for selected years. Notice that the ratio of revenues raised 
by social security to that from the income tax (shown in col. 5) rises 
from .07 in 1945  to .66 in 1983. 
Column 6  of  the  table shows  a  crude measure of  the  relative 
"efficiencies" of the two types of taxes. This measure  is the revenue Average Marginal Tax Rates  565 
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raised from social security divided by the contribution  of this levy to 
the overall average marginal  tax rate,7 expressed as a ratio to the 
corresponding  figure  for the income tax. On this basis the social secu- 
rity tax looks strikingly  more efficient. Specifically, in 1983  the social 
security  levy generates 2.5 times as much revenue per unit of average 
marginal  tax rate as does the income tax, whereas in 1965  the corre- 
sponding number was 4.3.  The main reason for the decline in this 
number  since 1965  is the sharp  rise in the ceiling  on earnings,  which has 
a positive effect on the average marginal  tax rate from social security, 
relative to the revenue generated. 
The social security levy turns out to be relatively "efficient" be- 
cause it combines two features of a tax-rate schedule that have been 
stressed in the literature  on optimal  taxation. First, it is a flat-rate  levy 
(on labor earnings and income from self-employment)  in the range 
where the tax rate is positive. The shift to a flat-rate  income tax has 
been proposed  by, among  others, Friedman  (1962,  ch. 10)  and Hall and 
Rabushka  (1983). (Surprisingly,  these authors  do not seem to mention 
that, in the social security tax, we already  have a close approximation 
to the flat-rate  income tax.) In comparison  with a graduated-rate  sys- 
tem, the flat-rate  levy generates the same amount of revenues at a 
lower average marginal  tax rate. Second, as advocated on theoretical 
grounds  by Mirrlees  (1971),  the social security  tax has a zero marginal 
rate at the top. However, as noted before, the rapid increase of the 
ceiling in recent years has made this feature  less important  than it used 
to be. 
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